The birth of international currency can be defined as the time at which the currency starts intelligently, which provides one of the traditional functions of money outside the country.
In the case of most currencies, this is not a straight line that refers to a specific date. The euro is another matter, at least for two reasons. The euro has no perfect historical precedent, and any comparison with similar systems of the past is doomed to end up in concluding that, after all, things are not fully comparable.
The current euro zone crisis therefore highlights long-term continuities in the history of European monetary cooperation that predate the euro’s creation.
Firstly, internationalization is of particular importance to the extent that the euro as the currency of the countries participating in monetary union, by definition, one used outside the country.
At first, the internationalization of the euro must be understood as non-residents of all this group of countries are becoming more or less regular euro user s. Second, unlike other currencies, the point of launching the exchange of internal euro (1 January 1999) was also the start date of its use at the international level, taking into account the fact that he inherited this role from a number of legacy currencies, which were issued countries participating in economic and monetary union in Europe.
Taking some broader perspective on the period of birth euro, this analysis looks at the evidence of the international use of the euro at about the time of its launch date, and includes the following events during the first decade of the euro. It first describes the birth of the euro as an international currency, based on the international role of its predecessor currencies. It then presents a series of stylized facts that characterized the role of the euro abroad for the first 10 years of EMU. Later, it refers to the analysis of the latest data provides some preliminary considerations on the possible impact of the global financial crisis on the international role of the euro.
So we can make a conclusion that the euro was not devised in a fit of giddy and irresponsible optimism – or panic at the prospect of German hegemony. The crisis of the euro and the reluctance of German hegemony seems to challenge the hegemony that is not necessary for the maintenance of international regime after regime is institutionally.
However, maintaining the euro crisis provides even see the importance of leadership in the context of cooperative modes, such as the EU, as a public good economic stability, probably will not be accessed through regional intergovernmental institutions facing the dilemma of collective action. On the other hand, in the case of German hegemony reluctance seems to show that management provides hegemon is likely to be limited to 8 of the regime.
Indeed, should the hegemon or take the initiative to change the ideological and organizational foundations of the regime or he must follow the rules and to strengthen the regime. The recent reform of EMU are on the latter, being coherent with the illusion, based monetary integration in Europe, fiscal consolidation and collective discipline can replace the need for fiscal union in EMU. The argument that Germany has dominated the economic situation in the euro area is confirmed. Secondly, although he finally supported by regional ESM bailout and adopted the status of the ECB as lender of last resort, Berlin was cautious and reluctant to grant these two functions. Furthermore, looking at three other public goods (open market for distressed goods, coordination of macroeconomic policies and exchange rate stability) Germany is not able to act as a Keynesian stabilizer. Indeed, the burden of adjustment is disproportionately heavy burden on countries with deficits as a result of Berlin emphasis on fiscal discipline and its refusal to reduce the surplus of bilateral trade GIIPS. In addition, although the minimum wage would be a step consistent with the expectations of the HST, evaluative its real impact and its implementation as a signal diluted hegemonic reluctance of Germany.